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I
INTRODUCTION
Both practitioners and students of intellectual property may benefit by
exposure to comparisons of the overall remedial schemes of the three
statutes' that encompass copyrights, patents, and trademarks. 2 Such a
survey3 is further warranted by my belief that, in general, we do not pay
enough attention to remedies. They come at the end of the road (with, of
course, the major exception of preliminary relief) and, for most of us, do not
have the intellectual challenge of determining the existence of rights. Yet
remedies are the payoff in litigation. Their potential severity, or lenity,
presumably influences business decisions. The risk of treble damages if one
skirts a patent too closely, or of a crippling injunction if a marketing program
Copyright © 1992 by Law and Contemporary Problems
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I am happy to have been invited to join in acclaiming Robert Kastenmeier's remarkable
contributions to the law of intellectual property. During his long service as member and Chair of the
House subcommittee, he left his imprint on major legislation. Just as important, he used his position
to discourage unwise proposals. At a time when Congress is in low esteem, his thirty-four years of
steady statesmanship shine like a beacon.
1. The Copyright Act of 1976, as amended, comprises title 17 of the U.S. Code (1988). The
Patent Act, codified in 1952, is found at 35 U.S. Code (1988). The Trademark Act of 1946 (the
Lanham Act), revised in 1988, is found in §§ 1051-1127 of 15 U.S. Code (1988).
2. Thejudge-made law of trademarks and unfair competition preceded the statutes. Common
law and statutes run almost parallel in substantive outline. The Lanham Act does offer enhanced
damages. 15 USC § 1117. See text at note 200. Punitive damages as a common law remedy in
unfair competition will be fleetingly noticed in Part VIC, see text at note 231. There are also state
unfair trade practices and consumer protection statutes covering much of the same ground. Such
statutes do not offer remedies to injured competitors, but rather to the state attorneys general and to
consumers. See Paul Goldstein, Edmund W. Kitch & Harvey S. Perlman, Selected Statutes and
International Agreements on Unfair Competition, Trademark, Copyright and Patent 1-15 (Foundation Press,
1989).
3. This exercise, because of its scope, is unavoidably superficial. I have accordingly been
especially dependent upon the leading treatises. I gratefully acknowledge help from Paul Goldstein,
Copyright: PrAinciples, Law and Practice (Little Brown, 1989, Supp 1991); Donald S. Chisum, Patents
(Matthew Bender, 1978); Jerome Gilson, Trademark Protection and Practice (Matthew Bender, 1988); J.
Thomas McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition (Law Co-op, 1984); Melville B. Nimmer & David
Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright (Matthew Bender, 1991). I have wholly neglected criminal sanctions
and trade secrets, as to which see William F. Johnson,Jr., Remedies in Trade Secret Litigation, 82 Nw U L
Rev 1004 (1978).
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runs into an existing trademark, ought to affect the advice of lawyers, as well
as the decisions of entrepreneurs.
The comparison will proceed from injunctive remedies, both before and
after trial, to the varying forms of monetary recoveries: actual damages
(which are usually plaintiffs' lost profits, or reasonable royalties), defendants'
profits, statutory substitutes for actual damages, and enhanced and punitive
damages. Each type of remedy is subdivided among copyrights, patents, and
trademark. Recovery of lawyers' fees by either party in copyright cases is the
topic of another contribution to this symposium, by Professor Peter Jaszi. 4
Fees in patent and trademark cases are not addressed here.
This comparison seeks to survey the dominant similarities and disparities
among the various remedies, illustrating the variations that have developed
over a century or more. Occasionally, the comparison will linger somewhat
on contentious matters, notably the conflict between the copyrights of some
authors and the first amendment privileges of other authors. 5
II
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
Professor Alan Latman tersely summed up the availability of preliminary
injunctions in 1970: "In copyright cases, such relief is often close to
automatic; in patent cases, it is close to impossible; in trademarks and unfair
competition, it depends."'6 The survey undertaken here will show a current
marked relaxation of preliminary injunction standards in patent cases and a
tilt toward granting preliminary injunctions in trademark/unfair competition
cases.
The plaintiff who gets a preliminary injunction has a tremendous
advantage. The defendant is stopped dead in his tracks. 7 Even if the
presentation of the two sides is confined to affidavits, depositions, and
exhibits,8 the court has given a clear signal that it believes the plaintiff is likely
to prevail. The grant of the preliminary injunction may be followed by
explicit judicial nudges toward settlement. The defendant can certainly see
ominous handwriting on the wall: thou hast been weighed in the balance and
4. Peter Jaszi, 505 and All That-The Defendant's Dilemma, 55 L & Contemp Probs 107 (Spring
1992).
5. See part IIIA of this article.
6. Alan Latman, Preliminary Injunctions in Patent, Trademark and Copyright Cases, 60 Trade-Mark
Rptr 506 (1970).
7. On the frequently decisive effect of a preliminary injunction in trademark cases, see Gilson,
Trademark Protection and Practice § 8.07[1] at 8-134 (cited in note 3).
8. Since federal jurisdiction is exclusive in copyright and patent cases, 28 USC § 1338(b)
(1988), and freely available in Lanham Act cases, 28 USC § 1338(a) (1988), most litigation is
governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and by Rule 65 for preliminary injunctions. Oral
testimony may be required if facts are in dispute. See Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, II
Federal Practice & Procedure § 2949 at 475 (West, 1973). The applicant for a preliminary injunction
must post security against injury to the defendant during the span of the injunction if the defendant
prevails. FRCP 65(c). From examples given in Wright & Miller, these security bonds are not
onerous in amount. Wright & Miller, 11 Federal Practice and Procedure § 2954 at 526-27 (cited in this
note).
[Vol. 55: No. 2
CIVIL REMEDIES: THEMES AND VARIATIONS
found wanting. It is a rare occurrence, especially when the grant of the
preliminary injunction has been upheld by a court of appeals, for further
reported litigation to occur. Since preliminary injunctions are almost routine
in copyright cases that make the modest necessary showing, one would expect
more copyright defendants to soldier on, in the hope of making a successful
defense in a full trial. But it is my observation that they do not.
Those who seek preliminary injunctions still have to overcome the
lingering notion that equitable remedies are extraordinary. To be sure, all of
the controlling statutes provide for injunctions, but the patent and trademark
statutes intone that injunctive relief flows "according to the principles of
equity." 9 This means that the litigants must show either that they have no
adequate remedy at law10 or that irreparable harm will occur if the injunction
does not issue.
A standard four-part test for a preliminary injunction asks:
(1) whether the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy at law or will be irreparably
harmed if the injunction does not issue;
(2) whether the threatened injury to the plaintiff outweighs the threatened harm the
injunction might inflict on the defendant;
(3) whether the plaintiff has at least a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits;
and
(4) whether the granting of a preliminary injunction will disserve the public
interest. 1
The application of this "test," which has rather murky variations of form
(and perhaps of substance) in the dominant Second' 2 and Ninth Circuits,' 3 is
eased by the shortcut of creating a presumption of irreparable harm. To
attain the shelter of such a presumption, the applicant need show only a
reasonable likelihood of success on the merits. No strong connection
between the notion of irreparable harm and a prediction of ultimate success
9. 15 USC § 1116(a).
10. The present Copyright Act makes no reference to "the principles of equity." It only directs
the court to set "such terms as it may deem reasonable." 17 USC § 502(a) An injunction remedy has
been part of the statute since 1819 and until 1978 it also was to be granted "according to the course
and principles of courts of equity." See William S. Strauss, Study No. 24, Remedies Other Than Damages
for Copyright Infringement, in Copyright Society of USA, ed, 2 Studies in Copyright 1031 (Fred B.
Rothman, 1963).
11. Atari, Inc. v North American Philips Consumer Electronics Corp., 672 F2d 607, 613 (7th Cir 1982).
In an attempt to clear up the "disarray" he finds in the cases, both with respect to the standards
themselves and the scope of review, Judge Posner has written two enormous opinions on the general
requirements for a preliminary injunction. Roland Machinery Co. v Dresser Industries, Inc., 749 F2d 380
(7th Cir 1984); American Hospital Supply v Hospital Industries, Ltd., 780 F2d 589 (7th Cir 1986). In both
casesJudge Swygert vigorously dissented on the inconsequentiality of distinctions between "abuse of
discretion" and "clear abuse of discretion," when reviewing trial court decisions. Such general
discussions of equitable standards and discretion can be engrossing, but they are not very helpful in
dealing with the separate worlds of intellectual property.
12. "[A] preliminary injunction can be granted if plaintiff shows irreparable injury, combined
with either a probability of success on the merits, or a fair ground for litigation and a balance of the
hardships in his favor." Wainwright Securities v Wall Street Transcript Corp., 558 F2d 91, 94 (2d Cir
1977).
13. "To obtain a preliminary injunction, a party must show either (1) a likelihood of success on
the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury, or (2) the existence of serious questions going to
the merits and the balance of hardships tipping in its favor." Apple Computer, Inc. v Formula
International, Inc., 725 F2d 521, 523 (9th Cir 1984).
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leaps to mind. No matter; courts do not often bother to demonstrate any such
connection, nor to spell out why a plaintiff who does not get a preliminary
injunction is, for the time being, left empty-handed. 14
A. Copyright
One commentator believes that this presumption of irreparable harm
explains the great ease of preliminary relief in copyright cases.' 5 Paul
Goldstein, while expressing concern that courts may be too quick to grant
"coercive relief" when the defendant's work consists only partly of infringing
material, concedes that such caution is rarely observed.16 As a rationale for
the ready presumption that damages may undercompensate he suggests:
"copyright protects more than the author's strictly economic interests; her
personal, aesthetic and reputational interests may also be at stake."1 7 Melville
Nimmer suggests as an explanation the transitory value of most copyrights in
such fields as "dramatic works, fabric designs and possibly video games."' 8
But, as he demonstrates with clouds of citations, the rush to presume
irreparable harm is not confined to such alleged ephemera.' 9
The most thorough recent appellate consideration of the four factors of
the preliminary injunction test emphasizes their interdependence. In Concrete
Machinery Co. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, Inc. ,20 Concrete charged Classic with
copying its lawn statuary-deer, swans, and such. Classic, in the brief
preliminary injunction hearing, emphasized differences in the creatures. The
trial court denied the injunction; the court of appeals reversed. In addition to
expounding substantive principles for finding infringement, the court of
appeals made its own positive appraisal of the plaintiff's likelihood of success,
and cautioned against giving undue weight to expected hardship on the
defendant if it was banned from the concrete lawn ornament business for the
time being. Such solicitude, the court observed, would favor a defendant
whose principal business was illicit copying. As for the public interest factor,
the court said there was clearly a public interest in protecting copyrights,
since Congress has beneficently authorized them.2' This is a conventional
quick way of dealing with the public interest.
One emerges from all this weighing of imponderables with a sense that
likelihood of success is the dominant factor. But if the defendant can take
14. This is the burden of Timothy J. McClimon, Denial of Preliminary Injunction in Copyright
Infringement Cases: An Emerging Judicially Crafted Compulsory License, 10 Colum-VLA J L & Arts 277
(1986). I do not share his view that courts too easily deny injunctions. His article is the helpful
source of the various "standards" quoted above. Id at 292-93.
15. Note, Copyright Law.-Likelihood of Success on the Merits Now Affects the Balance of Hardships in
Actions for Preliminary Relief, 23 Suffolk U L Rev 1133, 1136 (1989) (authored by Jeffrey DiNicola).
16. Goldstein, 2 Copyright § 11.10 at 248 (cited in note 3).
17. Id at 249.
18. 3 Nimmer on Copyright § 14.06[A] at 14-85 (cited in note 3).
19. Id at 14-86.
20. 843 F2d 600 (1st Cir 1988).
21. Id at 612. Compare].R. O'Dwyer co v Editorial Media Marketing, 18 USPQ (BNA) 2d 1356
(SDNY 1991) (defendant directory publisher "struggling to establish a market niche"; preliminary
injunction denied).
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arms to oppose a preliminary injunction, it is customarily asserted that the
entire matter is entrusted to the discretion of the trial court. The trial court
may and will deny the injunction 22 if the plaintiff does not seem to have much
of a case. Nevertheless, a persistent plaintiff, as in Concrete, can sometimes
overcome the denial. Whatever the reasons, the copyright plaintiff has a
distinct edge in a preliminary round that may turn out to be decisive.
B. Patents
Latman's "close to impossible" appraisal of the patent plaintiff's chances
of getting preliminary relief had solid support in case law before 1970. Judge
Learned Hand, with characteristic terseness, had written back in 1927 that "an
injunction pendente lite in a patent case should not go except when the patent is
beyond question valid and infringed." 23 This attitude persisted, and was
probably a reflection of the general low regard that many courts had long
displayed for the patents that emanated from the Patent Office. 2 4 Justice
Jackson, in a notorious quip, said that "[t]he only patent that is valid is one
which this Court has not been able to get its hands on."2 5
Attitudes toward patents began to change with the creation of the court of
appeals for the Federal Circuit in 1982. That court was given exclusive
appellate jurisdiction in all patent cases; its predecessor, the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals ("CCPA"), heard only appeals from the
tribunals of the Patent and Trademark Office. Infringement and related
matters had flowed to the eleven geographical courts of appeals and (once in
a great while) to the Supreme Court. 26
What appeared on the surface to be a jurisdictional shuffle resulted in the
rehabilitation of the patent system. Buoyed up by a rising tide of public
concern for innovation and competitiveness in world markets, the judges of
the Federal Circuit have followed their own predilections, markedly
improving the fortunes of patentees. Professor Dreyfuss, in the leading study
of the court's work, depicts this dramatic shift toward upholding patents.2 7
She also observes that the Federal Circuit "has revitalized the role of
preliminary injunctive relief in patent suits." 28
Decisions in the Federal Circuit's first decade have come to assert that the
standards for preliminary relief are the same as in other areas of intellectual
property; they currently invoke a version of the four-part formula recited
22. McClimon, 10 Colum-VLAJ L & Arts at 292-93 (cited in note 14), emphasizes such cases.
23. Simson Bros., Inc. v Blanchard & Co., 22 F2d 498 (2d Cir 1927).
24. See Dan B. Dobbs, Handbook on the Law of Remedies § 6.2 at 436 (West, 1973).
25. Jungersen v Osiby & Barton Co., 335 US 560, 572 (1949).
26. Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 NYU L Rev 1
(1989).
27. Id at 26; see also Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic
Perspectives on Innovation, 76 Cal L Rev 805 (1988) (Federal Circuit's receptivity to "secondary factors"
enhances patentability). Robert L. Harmon, Patents and the Federal Circuit (BNA, 1988), surveys all the
decisions.
28. Dreyfuss, 64 NYU L Rev at 19 (cited in note 26).
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above. 29 But they do so still with some diffidence30 and with arguably higher
thresholds of harm and likelihood of success than in copyright.
For example, Judge Giles Rich, the dean of the Federal Circuit, in
supporting a preliminary injunction, wrote that the burden upon the movant
(to justify a presumption of irreparable injury) "should be no different in a
patent case than for other kinds of intellectual property, where, generally,
only a 'clear showing' is required." 3' He then cites copyright cases where a
"clear showing" of validity and infringement was indeed present. He and
other judges who are loosening the bonds on plaintiffs in patent cases do not
appear to appreciate how easily the presumption of irreparable harm is
invoked in copyright.3 2
One advantage that the patent plaintiff now has stems from another act of
rehabilitation in the patent system. The statute has since 1952 conferred a
statutory presumption of validity upon patents.33 A patent has, after all,
survived the Patent Office examining process. However, in the old days when
litigated patents were invalidated far more frequently than they were
sustained, the presumption of validity counted for little.3 4 This presumption
is now "firmly established, ' 3 5 with the consequence that nowadays the burden
of persuasion of invalidity rests firmly on the party challenging the patent.
Moreover, the challenger must establish invalidity by clear and convincing
evidence.3 6 So, while the presumption of validity does not by itself satisfy the
requirements for preliminary relief, it is a favorable part of the context in
which the injunction-seeker makes her case. 37
In contrast, the copyright holder has a weak statutory presumption of
prima facie validity of the facts recited in a copyright registration. 38 It is weak
because the "facts" are simply what the applicant writes down as facts. It has
nothing resembling the flourishing presumption of patent validity, and figures
not at all in copyright preliminary injunction determinations. The availability
of preliminary relief in patent cases, we may conclude, is rising remarkably.
29. See text accompanying note 11. The shift commenced with Smith International, Inc. v Hughes
Tool Co., 718 F2d 1573, 1577-79 (Fed Cir 1983), which, however, still showed considerable deference
to "the more severe rule."
30. See Roper Corp. v Litton Systems, Inc., 757 F2d 1266 (Fed Cir 1985) (denying injunction for
failure to show irreparable injury).
31. Atlas Powder Co. v Ireco Chemicals, 773 F2d 1230, 1233 (Fed Cir 1985).
32. But see the fairly relaxed interpretation of the Federal Circuit's preliminary injunction
standards in Zeller Plastik, Koehn, Grabner & Co. v Joyce Molding Corp., 698 F Supp 1204, 1220 (D NJ
1988).
33. 35 USCA § 282 (1988). Nominally, the presumption already existed. See Judge Rich, a
principal drafter of the 1952 Act, in American Hoist and Derrick Co. v Sowa & Sons, 725 F2d 1350 (Fed
Cir 1984).
34. Dreyfuss, 64 NYU L Rev at 6 n35 (cited in note 26).
35. Idat21.
36. American Hoist and Derrick, 725 F2d at 1360.
37. H.H. Robertson Co. v United Steel Deck, Inc., 820 F2d 384, 388 (Fed Cir 1987). These trends are
summed up in Southwest Aerospace Corp. v Teledyne Industries, Inc., 702 F Supp 870 (ND Ala 1988).
38. 17 USC § 410(c).
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C. Trademarks
The plaintiff in a trademark infringement action generally wants the
defendant to stop using a symbol that is likely to confuse customers. She
would like the defendant stopped right away, before her market is eroded.
The setting seems highly appropriate for preliminary relief, which, not
surprisingly, is not hard to obtain. A reasonably strong showing of likely
confusion may be made at the preliminary hearing either through side-by-side
comparison of the trade symbols at issue or by introducing a customer survey.
Such a showing will satisfy the irreparable harm limb of the conventional four-
part formula that by now is familiar.
There is nothing at all extraordinary about injunctive relief in trademark
cases. It is the standard remedy. 39 Indeed, the appropriateness of equitable
relief, because of the difficulty of establishing monetary damages, is almost a
platitude in trademark and other unfair competition cases. More will be said
about this rationale in the later examination of monetary remedies.
Looking back from twenty years' accumulation of cases since Latman
wrote, there seems to be little occasion for his ambiguous judgment that,
when considering the availability of preliminary relief in trademark and unfair
competition cases, "it depends." 40 It does depend on satisfying the usual
formula, but it is easily satisfied. 4l
III
PERMANENT INJUNCTIONS
A. Copyright
Permanent injunctions are said to be a matter of course for a prevailing
plaintiff,42 but two exceptions may be developing, or at any rate should be
encouraged. One is auxiliary to the storm that blew up in the Second Circuit
about the privilege of an author to quote from unpublished works of another
author.43 Substantively, these thunderheads shadow a corner of fair use. If
the challenged use is fair, it is not an infringement.44 May there be cases
39. Restatement of the Law of Unfair Competition, Tentative Draft No. 3 § 35 at 86 (Am L Inst,
1991) ("ALI Restatement")
40. Latman, 60 Trade-Mark Rptr at 605 (cited in note 6).
41. This conclusion rests largely on the ALI Restatement § 35 at 86-87 (cited in note 39);
Gilson, 1 Trademark Protection and Practice § 8.07 at 8-126 (cited in note 3); and McCarthy, 2 Trademark
and Unfair Competition § 30.15 at 341 (cited in note 3).
42. 3 Nimmer on Copyright § 14.06 at 14-90 (cited in note 3).
43. Salinger v Random House, Inc., 811 F2d 90 (2d Cir 1987).
44. The judicial development of fair use is codified in 17 USC § 107, which is explicit that "fair
use . . .is not an infringement ...." The Supreme Court considered fair use of an unpublished
work, President Ford's memoirs, in Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v Nation Enterprises, 471 US 539
(1985), concluding that "the unpublished nature of a work is a 'key, though not necessarily
determinative, factor' tending to negate a defense of fair use," id at 554; the Court found that when
the Nation "arrogated to itself the right of first publication," id at 549, in printing key excerpts from
the memoirs, it did not satisfy the statutory standards. Harper & Row did not seek an injunction,
only the $12,500 it lost when Time magazine, "scooped" by the Nation's clandestine access to the
manuscript, cancelled its contract for first magazine publication.
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where the fair use privilege should be characterized as incomplete? That is,
cases in which the complaining author may not have an injunction, but may
recover damages. The second issue is similar. There are a few other
infringement situations where it may be sound policy to withhold the
injunction while assessing damages. A conspicuous recent instance is the
"Rear Window" movie case that reached the Supreme Court.4 5 The Court
affirmed the force of the renewal copyright's ownership, but left undiscussed
the ingenious remedy proposed by the court of appeals: that the marginally
deserving plaintiff46 could have a share of the profits from the popular movie,
but no injunction.
The quotability of unpublished works, sharpened by two episodes in the
Second Circuit (the reluctant sources were novelist J.D. Salinger 47 and cult-
leader L. Ron Hubbard 48 ), has elicited, in addition to the expectable flow of
academic opinion, a perhaps unique torrent of extra-judicial comment from
the judges49 and legislative proposals that may have come to fruition (or
decay) before this work is disseminated. 50 The narrow question in quoting
unpublished works is this: assuming that the window of permissible quotation
from what are indiscriminately labelled "unpublished" 51 works is to be
narrowly opened, should all the ventilation occur under the heading of fair
use, which excuses copying that would otherwise be infringement? Those
who reprehend the easy resort to injunctions in such cases tend to fall silent
after urging fewer injunctions and more fair use. 52 Justice Benjamin Kaplan,
in his inexhaustible source of good sense, the Unhurried View of Copyright, did
write that "courts have sometimes forgotten that an injunction does not go of
course; the interest in dissemination of a work may justify a confinement of
the remedy to a money recovery (just as it may suggest the legislative use, in
proper doses, of the device of a compulsory license)." 53 But how do you
measure the money recovery when the taking consists of a larger quota of
revelations than a careful judge thinks allowable as fair use?
45. Stewart v Abend, 110 S Ct 1750 (1990).
46. See text at note 63-64.
47. Salinger v Random House, Inc., 811 F2d 90 (2d Cir 1987).
48. New Era Publications, Int'l v Henry Holt & Co., 873 F2d 576 (2d Cir 1989).
49. See citations in notes 52, 54, 57, and 58.
50. A weak amendment to section 107 that would not "bar a finding of fair use" from
unpublished works passed the Senate by a voice vote on September 27, 1991. But on October 1, an
identical provision was dropped from a package of amendments before the House Subcommittee. Its
chairman opined that emerging developments in the Second Circuit would make it unnecessary. See
42 Patent Trademark & Copyright J (BNA) 520-23 (Oct 3, 1991).
51. To speak of "fair use of unpublished works" as if the cases were all essentially the same,
overlooks the gulf between Salinger's letters, which the addressees had deposited in university
research libraries, and Hubbard's journals and letters, some of which may have reached the
biographer through illicit channels. See text accompanying note 71.
52. Perhaps one can mildly fault the elegant lecture by Judge James Oakes for not developing
this minor theme. James Oakes, Copyright and Copy Remedies: Unfair Use and Injunctions, 18 Hofstra L
Rev 983 (1990). However, the lecture did direct me to the passage from Justice Kaplan. id at 994
n52, and it is invaluable on the larger issues attending injunctions. The Oakes lecture is relied upon
for the denial of permanent injunction in Love v Kwitny, 2 Copyright L Rptr (CCH) 26,789 (SDNY
1991).
53. Benjamin Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copyright 73 (Columbia U Press, 1967).
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Judge Leval in the L. Ron Hubbard dispute did opine that the biographer
had overstepped-somewhat. But the unexpected disposition of the case-its
dismissal for hurtful delay in bringing it-left unresolved precisely what Judge
Leval would have done about the excessive takings. It is clear he believed an
award of damages would be appropriate. 54 What kind of damages? There is a
plenitude of choice in copyright-actual damages, statutory damages, or a
share of defendant's profits. Actual damages from taking bits and pieces from
unpublished writings would be almost impossible to establish. How much of
defendant's profits could be attributed to a margin of copying beyond fair use
also seems rather conjectural. Statutory damages would likely be more
appropriate.
The claim of fair use of unpublished writings is of acute interest to
aficionados of fair use, but probably of infrequent occurrence. 55 Under
conventional doctrines, "facts" and "ideas" in unpublished works are never
protected by copyright. Fair use even permits taking a limited portion of the
author's expression when necessary for accurate reporting of factual
material.5 6 Then there is a stratum of copying that does not call for injunctive
relief, but will attract monetary recovery. How wide it is nobody knows; but,
as a result of good-tempered withdrawals from exposed positions, even Judge
Miner (who wants the fair use window to be closed),57 wrote for the court in
denying en banc rehearing of the L. Ron Hubbard case that "[a]ll now agree
that injunction is not the automatic consequence of infringement." 58
The limited scope of fair use of undisseminated writings, especially when
the unavailable material illuminates the lives of public figures-a President, a
major novelist, a powerful cult leader-illustrates the sometimes painful
tension between copyright and the first amendment. The biographer or
journalist has almost within her grasp illuminating material that cries for
publication. The copyright owner resists and has the copyright law on her
side. The tension becomes almost unbearable when the copyright holder
threatens an injunction, because one begins to smell the most offensive of
obstacles to speech, the prior restraint. Pages of history preach the
wickedness of prior restraints on publication,59 yet that is precisely what an
injunction does.
The conventional response of courts, when the first amendment confronts
copyright, is to say that the fair use privilege eases any tension. That
54. New Era Publications Intl v Henry Holt & Co., 695 F Supp 1493, 1523 (SDNY 1988). Pierre
Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 Harv L Rev 1105, 1131-32 (1990), further develops the
arguments for occasionally refusing injunctions, with references at note 112.
55. Leval, 103 Harv L Rev at 1134 n123 (cited in note 54), comments on the rarity of such
instances in his dealing with 150-200 copyright cases in 12 years on the bench.
56. Jon 0. Newman, Not the End of History: The Second Circuit Struggles with Fair Use, 37J Copyright
Society of USA 13, 14-15 (1989).
57. Roger Miner, Exploiting Stolen Text: Fair Use or Foul Play, 37 J Copyright Society of USA 1
(1989).
58. New Era, 884 F2d at 661.
59. See, for example, New York Times v United States, 403 US 713 (1971) (the "Pentagon Papers"
case).
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response, further lubricated by the freedom to appropriate facts and ideas,
takes care of most situations,60 but not that of the writer barred from using
unpublished material.
The other escape from an injunction, represented by the "Rear Window"
case, avoids constitutional emanations. The plaintiff claimed as assignee of
the renewal copyright term under the old statute, still very much alive in this
regard. 6' The defendant's film was a derivative work licensed during the first
term. Did the end of the first term end the license? There was respectable
authority both ways. 62 The Supreme Court reached the correct result63 and
affirmed the view of the court of appeals that the license was no longer valid.
Did that entitle Abend, who was rather a speculator in renewal copyrights, to
have an injunction that would stop the exhibition of "Rear Window" except
on whatever terms he might set? No, said the court of appeals (the Supreme
Court did not speak to the remedy issue). The value of the movie flowered in
large part because Alfred Hitchcock directed it, while Jimmy Stewart and
Grace Kelly were its stars.64 Abend, the copyright owner, was entitled to no
more than a generous apportionment of the movie's profits (it received a new
life when re-released in 1980).
This is the correct method of administering an award of profits and likely
the right way to dispose of this case. The same court (though through a
different panel) had made an earlier try at withholding an injunction. That
was in the famous Betamax case, on the legality of making cassettes of
copyrighted telecast movies for the convenience of shifting one's viewing-
time. The court of appeals differed with the district court and (more
decisively) with the Supreme Court. 65 It held that the provision of equipment
for that purpose constituted contributory infringement. It suggested that the
district court consider, instead of an injunction, a "continuing royalty,"
presumably on machines and blank tapes. 66
60. See cases and articles cited in Ralph S. Brown & Robert C. Denicola, A Note on Copyright and
the First Amendment, in Brown & Denicola, eds, Cases on Copyright 343-45 (Foundation Press, 1990);
Diane Zimmerman, Information as Speech, Information as Goods: Some Thoughts on Marketplaces and the Bill
of Rights, 33 Wm & Mary L Rev 665 (1992).
61. Works created before January 1, 1978 (the effective date of the present statute) continue to
have a first term of 28 years and are eligible for a renewal term of 47 years. Works already in the
renewal term on January 1, 1978 (as was the copyright construed in Abend) were extended to a total
duration of 75 years. 17 USC § 304(a), (b).
62. Miller Music Corp. v Charles N. Daniels, Inc., 362 US 373 (1960), and G. Ricordi & Co. v
Paramount Pictures, Inc., 189 F2d 469 (2d Cir 1951), support the plaintiff's position. Rohauer v Killiam
Shows, Inc., 551 F2d 484 (2d Cir 1977), was very close to the defendants', but it was repudiated by the
court of appeals and the Supreme Court in the "Rear Window" opinions.
63. But compare Barbara A. Allen & Susan R. Swift, Shattering Copyright Law: Will James Stewart's
Rear Window Become a Pain in the Glass?, 22 Pac LJ 1 (1990); Donald A. Hughes,Jurisprudential Vertigo:
The Supreme Court's View of "Rear Window" is for the Birds, 60 Miss LJ 239 (1990).
64. Abend v MCA, Inc., 863 F2d 1465, 1478 (9th Cir 1988).
65. Universal City Studios, Inc. v Sony Corp. of America, 480 F Supp 429 (CD Cal 1979) (no
infringement), rev'd 659 F2d 963 (9th Cir 1981), rev'd 464 US 417 (1984).
66. "This may very well be an acceptable resolution in this context." Sony Corp, 659 F2d at 976.
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This would have been a bold remedy indeed. Without legislative
authorization, 67 it would have created a compulsory license that all parties
would have had to accept. The "Rear Window" direction did this as well, as
would a case denying fair use but permitting the use of unpublished (or for
that matter, published) writings on payment of damages. Likewise, cases that
denied an injunction but afforded prospective monetary recovery would have
been of the same ilk.
The notion that you can deal with infringement by meeting a schedule of
payments is not unknown to copyright law. Obviously and pervasively,
voluntary licenses take care of millions of transactions, especially when one
considers the long reach of performing rights societies and their rivals. 68
Then, there are four kinds of compulsory licenses blessed by the statute.69
Professor Jane Ginsburg, in proposing to add a fifth (for informational works
of low-level authorship), concedes that "compulsory licensing is not a favored
technique in copyright law. It is a form of price regulation, and price
regulation is generally considered administratively cumbersome, unlikely to
arrive at a 'correct' rate, and contrary to copyright's overall free market
philosophy."' 70 Perhaps there is a niche for ad hoc judicial licenses to copy-
at a judicially set price? These avoid cumbersome administration and all
controls except the ad hoc decisions of judges.
It appears that the equitable slogans about irreparable harm and
inadequate legal remedies can and should be brushed aside and injunctions
denied in four borderline situations. First, the law should recognize a narrow
window of some copying from unpublished works beyond the boundaries of
fair use, controlled always by the circumstances. One should first ask, how did
the copier come by the material? As Judge Miner reminds us, the damaging
Hubbard papers almost surely reached the biographer through channels that
had an illegal origin. 7' By contrast, Salinger's letters were accessible in
university libraries, deposited there by such eminent correspondents as
Learned Hand. Judge Miner, ordinarily the unyielding foe of fair use of
unpublished material, seems to consider such letters "disseminated" and
open to quotation. 72 What about the plaintiff's cries that the biographer or
journalist is invading his privacy? Is copyright a proper vehicle for protecting
privacy? Judge Newman thinks so; 73 Judge Leval differs.74 One consideration
67. Marshall A. Leaffer, The Betamax Case: Another Compulsory License in Copyright Law, 3 U Toledo
L Rev 651, 680 (1982), was sympathetic to the compulsory license, but believed that it should be
legislated. Of course, Sony's success in the Supreme Court disposed of the problem.
68. See Brown & Denicola, eds, Cases on Copyright at 470-78 (cited in note 60).
69. Id at 494-509.
70. Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection of Works of Information, 90
Colum L Rev 1865, 1924 (1990).
71. Miner, 37J Copyright Society of USA at 5 (cited in note 57). But compare Edmund Kitch &
Harvey S. Perlman, Legal Regulation of the Competitive Process 732-33 (Foundation Press, 1991)
(skeptical ofJudge Miner's characterization).
72. Miner, 37 J Copyright Society of USA at 11 (cited in note 57).
73. Jon 0. Newman, Copyright Law and the Protection of Privacy, 12 Colum-VLA J L & Arts 459
(1984).
74. Leval, 103 Harv L Rev at 1119 (cited in note 54).
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is that privacy rights do not (yet) survive the claimant.7 5 There are several
ways to bore into the privacy claims, all within the grasp of a sensitive
chancellor.76
Second, the Abend-Stewart-Rear Window litigation offers a way to spare the
makers of valuable derivative works from total vanquishment by an injunction
at the hands of the owner of renewal copyright in the underlying work. The
new statute takes care of this; it has an exception to its new termination right
that permits a derivative work to "continue to be utilized."'77 But we still have
thirty-odd years before the last old renewal right rides off into the sunset.
Third, withholding an injunction may be highly appropriate when
infringements do not pervade the defendant's work, yet cannot be excised.
For example, suppose that a book is already printed. Injunction,
impoundment, and destruction 78 are a heavy-handed approach. To invoke
laches, as in the L. Ron Hubbard case, thus giving the plaintiff nothing, is
equally heavy-handed.
Finally, there may be instances, like the Sony Betamax case, where brute
public pressure to open up a technology may call for dividing the pie rather
than preferring one party to another.79 None of these four scenarios should
occur often enough to overload judicial capacities.80
B. Patents
Permanent injunctions in favor of a prevailing patentee are so thoroughly
a matter of course that Professor Chisum does not even discuss them in his
leading multi-volume scholarly treatise.8' What, if anything, is of interest?
There are cases that allow withholding the injunction where infringement had
75. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D, comment i (Am L Inst, 1977).
76. Leval, 103 Harv L Rev at 1119 n67 (cited in note 54).
77. 17 USC § 203(b)(1). All grants made afterJanuary 1, 1978 (other than by will) are subject to
termination after 35 years. The exception referred to is intended to safeguard producers' interests in
old movies, and to spare them from what almost happened to Stewart and the other defendants in
the Rear Window case.
78. Impoundment and destruction of offending copies provided for in 17 USC § 503 are within
the court's discretion. Such dispositions can be harsh. See J. Marc Alexander, Discretionary Power to
Impound and Destroy Infringing Articles: An Historical Perspective, 29 J Copyright Society of USA 479
(1982); Paul S. Owens, Impoundment Procedures under the Copyright Act: The Constitutional Infirmities, 14
Hofstra L Rev 211 (1985).
79. An example may be the introduction of digital audio taping (DAT) with a legislated
compulsory royalty on machines and tapes. 42 Patent, Trademark & CopyrightJ (BNA) 329 (Aug 8,
1991).
80. A decision that came down while this article was in progress makes large claims for first
amendment influence on the scope of injunctions. In Cable News Network, Inc. v Video Monitoring
Services of America, 940 F2d 1471 (11 th Cir), the defendant monitored all of plaintiff's programs, and
sold selected copies to advertisers and other interested buyers. CNN had not licensed VMS; it
licensed another monitoring company. CNN registered its copyright on one segment of "Crossfire,"
sued VMS for infringement, and obtained a sweeping preliminary injunction that forbade any
copying of plaintiff's broadcasts. This decision was reversed as overbroad in that it attempted to
restrict copying of future broadcasts that could not yet have copyright because they had not yet been
created, and in any event would be full of uncopyrightable factual news. The panel decision has been
vacated and set for reargument en banc. 43 Patent, Trademark & Copyright J (BNA) 115 (Dec 12,
1991).
81. Chisum, Patents (cited in note 3).
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ceased and was unlikely to resume.82 A lively short practitioner's piece by
Herbert Schwartz is instructive. 3 There is a little pocket of cases where the
patentee was not working the patent and the infringer was dependent on it; a
compulsory license was in effect created, and the injunction withheld. 4 But it
was an abuse of discretion to spare one of several infringing makers of
sailboards because his enterprise was such a little one; and it got the
defendants nowhere to plead that the patent had only a year to run, or only
three months. The injunctions came down nevertheless.8 5
Schwartz also reports on the decline of a practice of allowing stays of
injunction pending an appeal. The grounds for the infringers' getting such a
stay were just the reverse of those for getting an injunction-a showing of no
irreparable harm to the patentee, etc. The real motive was to buy time, and to
hope that the patent on appeal would be found invalid or not infringed.86
The new severity against infringers was dramatized in the great case in which
Polaroid knocked Eastman out of the instant camera business. The stay was
denied; Eastman appealed the denial; within weeks the Federal Circuit upheld
the denial, as did the Circuit Justice. The next day Eastman gave up.87
C. Trademarks
Because an injunction is the primary remedy for trademark infringements,
the successful plaintiff, whether or not she has sought preliminary relief, will
routinely get a permanent injunction. These may differ from copyright and
patent injunctions. The copyright infringer has copied from an identified
specific work or works of the plaintiff. The injunction will tell him to copy no
more, or to stop performing an identified musical or dramatic work. Only
occasionally is there ambiguity as to what is protected.8 8 Likewise with
patents. The infringer ordinarily is manufacturing or selling something
identifiably similar to the subject of the plaintiff's patent. If she attempts to
circumvent an injunction by altering her product-but not enough-that
would be the occasion for a contempt citation.8 9
82. Albert H. Walker, 7 Lipscomb's Walker on Patents § 25:35 at 347 (Law Co-op, 1989).
83. Herbert F. Schwartz, Injunctive Relief in Patent Cases, 50 Albany L Rev 565 (1986).
84. Id at 566; Foster v American Mach & Foundry Co., 492 F2d 1317 (2d Cir 1974).
85. Schwartz, 50 Albany L Rev at 571 (cited in note 83).
86. Id at 572.
87. Id at 573-74.
88. With regard to copyrightable cartoon characters (of the Superman genre), is it the character
simply as depicted, beyond a rather simple delineation of a man in tights and a cape, or the character
performing certain feats that establish his protectable content? The Second Circuit wrestled with
this twice, speaking through the two Judges Hand. Judge Augustus Hand said that the plaintiff must
show copying of some "incidents and literary expressions." Detective Comics, Inc. v Bruns Publications,
Inc., 111 F2d 432, 433 (2d Cir 1940). Judge Learned Hand went a step further and required a strip-
by-strip analysis. National Comics Publications, Inc. v Fawcett Publications, Inc., 198 F2d 927 (2d Cir
1952). On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit seemed to accept the Pac-man figures on TV games as
protectable just from their appearance. Atari v North American Philips Consumer Electronics Corp., 672
F2d 607, 619 (7th Cir 1982).
89. What happens in contempt proceedings seems to get little attention either from
commentators or in reported decisions. For discussion of contempt proceedings in patent cases see
Harmon, Patents and the Federal Circuit at 403-08 (cited in note 27).
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In contrast, a challenged trademark may be confusing in some contexts,
but not in others. Accordingly, the injunction must often be qualified to
delineate what may be forbidden and what permitted.90 A traditional way of
minimizing confusion has been to require disclaimers by the defendant of any
confusing connection with the plaintiff. A fanciful (but probably ineffective)
example:
Tiffany Hairbrush
Not connected with Tiffany & Co.
Fifth Ave., New York
Considerable skepticism has developed over the years: maybe disclaimers
are themselves confusing. Commentators report a decline in their acceptance
as a way out of liability,9 ' but there are still occasions on which they can
contribute to a fair solution. A qualified injunction can state precisely how a
disclaimer must read.
The circumstances that call for a qualified injunction are many. There are
only a few broad categories that implicate major substantive issues in
trademark law. First, is the defendant selling something that the plaintiff also
sells or does the challenged product (or service) not directly compete, as for
example, a Tiffany car wash? This might still be a preventable use, because it
might be thought to imply, falsely, sponsorship by Tiffany; Tiffany is a highly
distinctive mark because of its long association with luxury jewelry.9 2 This
would ordinarily call for a yes-or-no decision, but it might be amenable to a
disclaimer.
Suppose that someone named Tiffany wanted to give his name to a jewelry
store. This again might be an appropriate case for requiring the newcomer to
use his given name plus a disclaimer. Nowadays, courts are highly skeptical of
the claim of people who want to use a famous name, even if it is also their
own.
9 3
It is fundamental in trademark law that generic names cannot be
appropriated. Yet the capacities of qualified injunctions may also assist the
first user of a symbol that has become generic. "Aspirin" for the familiar
pain-reliever and "thermos" for vacuum bottles became generic, but the first
users were not entirely wiped out. Judge Learned Hand decided that Bayer
could still have exclusive rights to the "aspirin" label in the wholesale (but not
the retail) trade;94 and a later court preserved the distinctive logo of the
90. This section draws largely on ALI Restatement § 35, comments c and d (cited in note 39).
91. Jacob Jacoby & Robert L. Reaskoff, Disclaimers in Trademark Infringement Litigation: More
Trouble Than They are Worth?, 76 Trademark Rptr 35 (1986); Mitchell E. Radin, Disclaimers as a Remedy
for Trademark Infringement: Inadequacies and Alternatives, 76 Trademark Rptr 59 (1986), cited in Home
Box Office v Showtime, 832 F2d 1311, 1316 (2d Cir 1987). A careful recent decision suggesting that a
disclaimer might be appropriate is Jim Beam Brands Co. v Beamish & Crawford, Ltd., 937 F2d 729, 737
(2d Cir 1991).
92. See, for example, Tiffany & Co. v Tiffany Tile Corp., 345 F2d 214, 215 (CCPA 1965).
93. See generally McCarthy, 2 Trademarks and Unfair Competition ch 13 at 577 et seq (cited in note
3).
94. Bayer Co. v United Drug Co., 272 F 505, 515 (SDNY 1921).
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American Thermos Co., even though the word "thermos" became open for
competitors to use.95
Another circumstance that requires adjustment of rival interests occurs
when the same mark develops in different parts of the country. This has its
own complexities96 and is mentioned here only as one more example of the
need to tailor injunctions.
Finally, the rise of advertising and marketing practices that make explicit
and unfavorable reference to competing products stirs quarrels about
whether the comparison is a legitimate non-trademark use of another's
trademark, or whether the name of the (usually more expensive) product will
confuse buyers into thinking that they are being offered the more costly brand
at a reduced price. If there is an injunction, it must be framed with great
particularity, and may lead to repeated trips back to court on contempt
charges if the defendant is persistent. 97
These hasty forays into the contentious substance of trademark law show
that the framing of injunctions (preliminary or permanent) often demands
more discriminating adjustments than are usually necessary in copyright and
patent. One overriding observation: if the court is convinced that the
defendant is exploiting the plaintiff's mark "in bad faith"-a phrase encrusted
with equitable barnacles-it will probably not bother with the refinements
suggested. 98 An injunction will issue absolutely banning defendant's use of
the mark.
D. Introduction to Monetary Remedies 99
Monetary remedies in intellectual property will be broken down among
three categories: damages (Part IV) profits (Part V), and enhanced recoveries
(Part VI). "Damages" has its ordinary meaning. "Profits" refers to the
formerly equitable remedy of an accounting of defendant's profits resulting
from an infringement. This remedy is to be distinguished from a plaintiff's
lost profits, which may enter into the calculation of damages. "Enhanced
recoveries" refers to the availability of triple damages in some patent and
trademark settings (including enhanced profits for trademarks), to statutory
damages that are optional in copyright, and to punitive damages that may be
available in state unfair competition law.
95. King-Seeley Thermos Co. v Aladdin Industries, Inc., 321 F2d 577, 579 (2d Cir 1963) (additional
restrictions also prescribed).
96. See generally McCarthy, 2 Trademarks and Unfair Competition ch 26 at 281 et seq (cited in note
3).
97. See, for example, Oral-B Labs, Inc. v Mi-Lor Corp., 810 F2d 20 (2d Cir 1987).
98. Restatement of the Law of Unfair Competition, Tentative Draft No 2, § 19 at 153 (Am L
Inst, 1990).
99. A survey similar in scope to this one is Gary M. Ropski & Marc S. Cooperman, Damages in
USA Intellectual Property Litigation, 72 J Patent & Trademark Office Society 179 (1990). The authors
conclude that "[i]ntellectual property litigation is focussing more and more on monetary awards." Id
at 211. Earlier surveys include Comment, Monetary Recovery under the Copyright, Patent, and Trademark
Acts, 45 Tex L Rev 953 (1967) (authored by Paul H. Hubbard).
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All but the last of these remedies are authorized by the relevant major
statutes, in settings that vary in their degree of detail. The major differences
among copyright, patent, and trademark are the presence of a range of
statutory damages in copyright, the absence of resort to defendant's profits in
patent law, and the downplaying of damages in trademark cases. These, and
some minor differences, will be expounded.
IV
DAMAGES
A. Copyright
Sometimes, but not often, a plaintiff's damages from an infringing act are
crystal-clear. Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises 100 is such a truly rare case.
When Nation "scooped" the publication of former President Ford's memoirs
by publishing the most vivid parts about Nixon's resignation and pardon, Time
magazine, which had paid in advance half of a $25,000 contract with Harper
for publishing similar excerpts, cancelled and refused to pay the remaining
$12,500. That amount was what Harper sued Nation for and won.
Ordinarily, the problem is to make a reasonable estimate of the plaintiff's
sales captured by the infringer and the profits plaintiff would have made on
those sales. Sometimes this inquiry is uncomplicated. Thus, in a 1970
Second Circuit case,' 0 ' the plaintiff produced a copyrighted lace design for
one customer. That customer, Warner, persuaded defendant to copy the
design more cheaply. As the court said, "it is plain that what Warner
purchased from defendant, Warner would have bought from plaintiff had
defendant not infringed." 0 2
Once adrift from such a tight identity between defendant's sales and
plaintiff's lost sales, particularization of plaintiff's losses can become difficult.
She must show that defendant's acts caused her lost sales. There may be other
reasons for a falling-off; the bare fact of a decline from one year to the next
need not be decisive. 1° 3 For example, the defendant may be reaching a
somewhat different market. 0 4
For an illustration of the difficulty of deciding damages in copyright
infringements, one can turn to recent decisions that have put the Second and
Seventh Circuits somewhat at odds. The Seventh Circuit case, Deltak, Inc. v.
Advanced Systems, Inc.,10 5 was an unusual one, aside from the copyright
damages problems, in that the redoubtable Judge Posner, sitting as a district
judge, found for the defendant-and was reversed by a panel of his colleagues
on the court of appeals. The defendant had copied a substantial item from
plaintiff's packet of computer program instruction materials. The item was
100. 471 US 539 (1985).
101. Thomas Wilson & Co. v IrvingJ Dorfman Co., 433 F2d 409 (2d Cir 1990).
102. Idat410.
103. See Taylor v Meirick, 712 F2d 1112, 1120 (7th Cir 1983).
104. As in F. W. Woolworth Co. v Contemporary Arts, Inc., 344 US 228 (1952).
105. 767 F2d 357 (7th Cir 1985).
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not sold separately. Neither plaintiff's damages nor defendant's profits could
be established, and the plaintiff was ineligible for statutory damages because
its packet had not been registered.'0 6 Under these circumstances, the court of
appeals reached the conclusion that the value of use to the defendant could
and should be determined, and such value would be plaintiff's recoverable
damages. This actual value, the (non-existent) fee to which a willing buyer
and a willing seller would have agreed, was left to be resolved by the trial
court.
The facts in the Second Circuit case' 0 7 were remarkably similar, except
that modest profits to the defendant were established and upheld. 10 8 But
Judge Winter for the court of appeals explicitly rejected Deltak's "value of
use" approach as calling for an unrealistic "fictive" recreation of market value
to the defendant of the wrongfully copied material. That this left the plaintiff
almost empty-handed was the consequence of Congress's decision to deny
statutory damages to authors who fail to make timely registration. Judge
Winter drew support from the repudiation of Deltak by the Nimmer
treatise.' 0 9 Professor Goldstein, however, thinks that Deltak is right."10 For
what it is worth, so do I, even though the Deltak approach is somewhat
roundabout.
These two cases are challenging attempts to apply simple anodynes to
hard cases. The simple anodynes are that damages are intended to
compensate for the decline in market value of a copyright because of
defendant's conduct, and that such declines can be measured by lost sales or
by estimating reasonable royalties.' 1 Fortunately for plaintiffs, that these
data can often be neither found nor estimated does not deter courts from
trying. Damages do get awarded.
B. Patents
The same basic principle applies to patents as well as to copyrights. A
plaintiff should be made whole for what she has lost because of defendant's
infringement. There are significant differences in emphasis, however, two of
which are laid down in the statute: damages must be "adequate," and in no
event less than "a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the
infringer."'1 2 The search for a minimum reasonable royalty is combined with
106. See 17 USC § 412.
107. Business Trends Analysts, Inc. v Freedonia Group, Inc., 887 F2d 399 (2d Cir 1989).
108. Recoverable profits were found to be about $4,000. The trial court (which was affirmed as
to profits and reversed on damages) calculated damages of $50,000. Id at 402.
109. Id at 405, citing 3 Nimmer on Copyright § 14.02 at 14-16 through 14-17 (cited in note 3).
110. Goldstein, Copyright § 12.1.1.1 at 181 (Supp 1991) (cited in note 3).
111. Reasonable royalty equivalents may be inferred from past licensing transactions. See
Goldstein, 2 Copyright § 12.1.1 at 317-18 (cited in note 3).
112. 35 USC § 284 (adequate damages must compensate plaintiff for "the value of what was
taken"); Bandag, Inc. v Gerrard Tire Co., 704 F2d 1578, 1582 (Fed Cir 1983). Two valuable recent
works on the topic of section 284 areJohn M. Skenyon & Frank P. Procelli, Patent Damages, 70J Patent
& Trademark Office Society 762 (1988); and Ned L. Conley, An Economic Approach to Patent Damages,
15 Am Intell Prop L QJ 354 (1987). Consult also Peter B. Frank & MichaelJ. Wagner, Computing Lost
Profits and Reasonable Royalties, 15 Am Intell Prop L QJ at 391 (authors are accountants).
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diligent attention to plaintiff's lost profits as a proper measure of damages-a
diligence enhanced by the unavailability of defendants' profits in patent
remedies, a disparity that is underscored in Part V of this article.
A third area of emphasis is causation. In copyright, the defendant in his
work has copied, distributed, performed, or publicly displayed an identified
work of the plaintiff. In the technological world of patents, there may be
competing patents, or there are often unpatented ways of doing the same
thing. Similarly, in copyright law the defendant is free to use writings that are
in the public domain; damages and injunctions should take account of this
important privilege."13 The patent owner must clear several hurdles. "To
obtain as damages the profits [the patent owner] would have made absent the
infringement," the owner must prove: "(1) demand for the patented product,
(2) absence of acceptable noninfringing substitutes,' 14 (3) his manufacturing
and marketing capability to exploit the demand, and (4) the amount of the
profit he would have made."" 5 The plaintiff in Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Brothers
Fibre Works did not establish lost profits, so the decision focused on reasonable
royalties. Panduit is nevertheless regarded as the source of the four-element
test for lost profits and is faithfully followed."16
The apparent rigors of the four-fold test are softened by a light burden on
the plaintiff: he need show only a "reasonable probability" of each
element." 7 Further, once the plaintiff has met his burden, the infringer has
the burden of persuading an appellate court that the trial court miscalculated
the lost profits. There are still other advantages for the patent owner. He
may use an "incremental income" approach to calculate lost profits: if fixed
costs have been covered by previous sales, they do not have to be accounted
for in estimating profits on lost sales. Further, the "entire market value" rule
allows the patentee to recover lost profits or royalties on unpatented
components that normally would be sold with the patented machine." 18
113. Courts often fail to recognize this fact. See Gary L. Francione, Facing the Nation: The
Standards for Copyright, Infringement, and Fair Use of Factual Works, 134 U Pa L Rev 519 (1986).
114. Skenyon and Porcelli state that this is the most heavily litigated question in lost profit cases.
See Skenyon & Porcelli, J Patent & Trademark Office Society at 779 (cited in note 112). There are
several dimensions of this "but for" requirement that cannot be explored in this survey. See id at
779-83. One that favors the patentee and that has only very recently been recognized by the Federal
Circuit is the idea that even if there are competing alternatives, the patentee is at least entitled to
profits on a volume of sales equal to his existing share of the market. State Industries, Inc. v Mor-Flo
Industries, Inc., 883 F2d 1573 (Fed Cir 1989). See the 1991 update of Skenyon and Porcelli's article.
John M. Porcelli & Frank P. Skenyon, Patent Damages-Life in the 'But-For' World 1.50-1.61
(unpublished paper presented before the ABA section of Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law on
Aug 12, 1991).
115. Panduit Corp. v Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, 575 F2d 1152, 1156 (6th Cir 1978). Panduit is a
powerful opinion by Judge Markey, Chief Judge of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and
then of the Federal Circuit until 1991. In it he seems to be instructing his colleagues on the Sixth
Circuit, with whom he was temporarily sitting, on many aspects of patent law.
116. See note 114 and the cases cited therein.
117. Kaufman Co., Inc. v Lantech, Inc., 926 F2d 1136, 1141 (Fed Cir 1991) (describing "reasonable
probability" as an "objective test").
118. Skenyon & Porcelli, 70 J Patent & Trademark Office Society at 783-85 (cited in note 112).
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Finally, the patentee can argue that her profits would have been greater
had it not been for "price erosion"-the free-riding infringer's depression of
prices from the level that the patentee would have enjoyed had her legal
monopoly not been impaired by the infringer's unlawful competition.," 9
Overall, proof of damages based on lost profits has been eased and
expanded remarkably since the Federal Circuit came into being. The
"reasonable royalty" assurance has likewise flowered. As recently as 1980,
the Third Circuit refused to recognize a reasonable royalty higher than a rate
that had been established in several licenses, despite the patentee's persuasive
argument that the rate he could collect had been driven down by the
defendant's notorious infringement (though the court did allow the damages
to be doubled).' 20
In finding a reasonable royalty, a trial court considers fifteen factors
enumerated in an influential 1970 decision.' 2 ' The most problematic of these
factors is the fifteenth, which dictates that, in the absence of an established
royalty, the trier must construct the royalty rate to which a willing seller and a
willing buyer would have agreed before the infringement commenced. In
1988, Judge Markey denounced this whole exercise as "fantasy," saying that
such a calculation should at least be informed by experience.' 22
Here again, the benign ingenuity of the Federal Circuit has been at work
developing a variety of devices that calculate "reasonable" royalties far
beyond what any pre-infringement deal might have conceived.' 2 3 One
especially significant development is the award of a combination of lost profits
on that part of the market for which they plausibly can be calculated, with
reasonable royalties on the remainder. 124 Another pronounced advantage
created for the patentee awards damages for the sales of many collateral non-
119. All of the advantages catalogued in the preceding two paragraphs are discussed in the
Skenyon & Procelli articles (cited in notes 112 and 114). An opinion that deals with several of them
is Paper Converting Machine Co. v Magna-Graphics, 745 F2d 11 (Fed Cir 1984). The most celebrated
damages award of modern times ($909.5 million) is Polaroid Corp. v Eastman Kodak Co., 16 USPQ 2d
1481 (D Mass 1990). There the defendant argued unsuccessfully that its (infringing) entry had
expanded the total market for instant camera and that accordingly Polaroid's damages were lessened.
Id at 1495-98.
120. Trio Process Corp. v L. Goldstein's Sons, Inc., 612 F2d 1353 (3d Cir 1980). In this case, the
plaintiff endured fourteen years of litigation and four trips to the court of appeals!
121. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v U.S. Plywood-Champion Papers, Inc., 318 F Supp 1116, 1120 (SDNY
1970), modified on different grounds and aff'd 446 F2d 295 (2d Cir 1971).
122. Fromson v Western Litho. Plate & Supply Co., 853 F2d 1568, 1575 (Fed Cir 1988). The
importance of attending to experience was declared by the Supreme Court in Sinclair Refining Co. v
Jenkins Petroleum Co., 289 US 689, 698 (1933). Conley, 15 Am Intell Prop L QJ at 377 (cited in note
112), still contends the search for a rate that "would have been" reached is a "real-world approach,"
in contrast to an "analytic" approach advocated by Skenyon and Porcelli, 70 J Patent & Trademark
Office Society at 398 (cited in note 112).
123. For examples, see Porcelli & Skenyon, Patent Damages-Life in the 'But-For' World at 1.16 (cited
in note 114).
124. See id at 1.5; Skenyon & Porcelli, 70 J Patent & Trademark Office Society at 784 (cited in
note 112).
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patented items that ordinarily would follow the sale of a patented item (for
example, sales of eyeglasses accompanying a patented display case).' 25
All in all, the lower courts, egged on by the Federal Circuit, 126 are heeding
Judge Markey's wry observation in Panduit that "[t]he infringer would have
nothing to lose and everything to gain if he could count on paying only the
normal, routine royalty non-infringers could pay."' 27 For example, the court
in Stickle held that "the trial court may award an amount of damages greater
than the reasonable royalty so that the award is adequate to compensate for
the infringement." 128
Finally, a word about pre-judgment interest is warranted. Section 284,
alone among the three statutes on which this survey is based, 129 directs the
award of "interest and costs as fixed by the court."' 30 In General Motors Corp.
v. Devex Corp.,131 the Supreme Court, after noting that the phrase " 'fixed by
the court' . . . leavei the court some discretion," held that "prejudgment
interest should be awarded under section 284 absent some justification for
withholding such an award."' 32 This pronouncement has resulted in routine
awards of prejudgment interest, according to Porcelli and Skenyon.' 33 They
point out that patent cases can be extremely protracted, so that "prejudgment
interest can easily equal or exceed the basic damages award."' 34
The absence of any general provision for prejudgment interest in the
copyright and trademark statutes is matched only by the complete silence of
the standard treatises and a bare whisper from case law. Two courts of
appeals have recently reached contrary outcomes in copyright cases.I3 5 Judge
Posner, for a Seventh Circuit panel, not only endorsed an award of
prejudgment interest against a flagrant trademark infringer, but went on "to
generalize, and to announce a rule that prejudgment interest should be
presumptively available to victims of federal law violations."' 136 Professor
Dobbs, reviewing the topic at large, apart from statutory directions or
silences, reports "a continued state of uncertainty and even irrationality."'' 3 7
125. Trans-World Mfg. Corp. v Al Nyman & Sons, Inc., 750 F2d 1552, 1568 (Fed Cir 1984). See
Skenyon & Porcelli, 70J Patent Trademark Office Society at 770 (cited in note 112). This "convoy
effect" is very like the "entire market value" rule mentioned at text accompanying note 119.
126. See, for example, Sickle v Heublein, Inc., 716 F2d 1550, 1561-62 (Fed Cir 1983).
127. Panduit, 575 F2d at 1158.
128. Sickle, 716 F2d at 1563 (emphasis added).
129. But with respect to counterfeit trademarks, the court is given discretion to award prejudgment
interest. 15 USC § 1117(b).
130. 35 USC § 284.
131. 461 US 648 (1983).
132. Id at 656-57.
133. Porcelli & Skenyon, Patent Damages-Life in the 'But-For' World at 1.76 (cited in note 114).
134. Id. An example is Devex, 461 US at 651, where damages were almost $9 million, while
interest came to $11 million. The case, concluded in 1983, began in 1956!
135. Compare Robert R. Jones Associates, Inc. v Nino Homes, 858 F2d 274 (6th Cir 1988) (interest
award vacated), with Frank Music Corp. v Metro-Coldwin-Mayer, Inc., 886 F2d 1545 (9th Cir 1989)
(Copyright Act of 1909 allows award of interest).
136. Gorenstein Enterprises, Inc. v Quality Care-USA, Inc., 874 F2d 431, 436 (7th Cir 1989). A
concurring judge parted company with the dictum, believing that prejudgment interest was a matter
of discretion. Id at 438-39 (Ripple concurring).
137. Dan B. Dobbs, Handbook on the Law of Remedies § 3.5 at 173 (West, 1973).
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C. Trademarks
Damages are said to play a subordinate role in trademark disputes, chiefly
because the plaintiff need establish only the likelihood of confusion in order to
win the primary remedy of an injunction. If the plaintiff cannot show any
actual confusion, ordinarily she cannot prove any damages.' 38 Once the
plaintiff can demonstrate actual confusion and lost sales, or injury to
reputation, damages are available.139
The prevalence of franchising trademarks opens the door to a reasonable
royalty approach to damages; that is, what the plaintiff usually charges for the
use of its name. Fortunately, this royalty approach is nowhere near as
common nor as complicated as that utilized in patent law.' 40
One form of damages is unique to trademark and unfair competition law:
the occasional practice of requiring defendants to pay for corrective
advertising. The leading case on this remedy is not a trademark case at all.'
41
It arose from a massive misleading advertising campaign directed at running
down U-Haul, the dominant truck and trailer rental company. Jartran sought
a share of that market, and indulged in tactics that left it at the wrong end of a
$40 million "damages" judgment.' 42 More closely linked to a trademark is
the well-known "reverse confusion" case of Big 0 Tire Dealers v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co.,143 where the large defendant massively appropriated the small
plaintiff's "Bigfoot" trademark for tires. The damages, as revised by the
court of appeals, included $678,302 in lieu of corrective advertising.' 44
These cases, like trademark monetary remedy cases generally, are suffused
with equitable considerations. Preoccupation with equity is doubtless
influenced by the sequence of section 35 of the trademark statute, which
states that a successful plaintiff "shall be entitled .. .subject to the principles of
equity, to recover (1) defendant's profits, (2) any damages sustained by the
plaintiff, and (3) the costs of the action."' 45 Thus, all elements of monetary
recovery in trademark cases are under the influence of equity.
138. Champion Spark Plug Co. v Sanders, 331 US 125, 128-30 (1947). See generally, McCarthy, 2
Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 30:28 at 514-17 (cited in note 3). The statutes in about half the
states that penalize trademark dilution authorize injunctive relief only. See, for example, Mass Ann
Laws ch I IOB, § 13 (Michie/Law Co-op 1985).
139. See Story Parchment Co. v Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 US 555, 563 (1931) (proof of some
damage permits considerable leeway in estimating the amount of damage).
140. And it is subject to the same criticism that is levelled in patent law-that a going royalty rate
does not sufficiently deter or punish an intentional infringer. See McCarthy, 2 Trademarks and Unfair
Competition § 30:27(D) at 512-13 (cited in note 3).
141. U-Haul International, Inc. vJartran, Inc., 793 F2d 1034 (9th Cir 1986). See also Arthur Best,
Monetary Damages for False Advertising, 49 U Pitt L Rev 1 (1987).
142. U-Haul, 793 F2d at 1037.
143. 561 F2d 1365 (10th Cir 1977).
144. Id at 1375.
145. 35 USC § 1117(a) (emphasis supplied).
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V
PROFITS
A. Copyright
The primary aim of damages awards in copyright cases is to transfer to the
copyright owner all or part of the profits that a defendant has gained by
infringing. Though the origin of this remedy lies in the restitutionary
tendencies of courts of equity, the foundation is (and has been since 1909)
statutory, specifically section 504(b), which states:
The copyright owner is entitled to recover the actual damages suffered by him or
her as a result of the infringement, and any profits of the infringer that are attributable
to the infringement and are not taken into account in computing the actual damages.
In establishing the infringer's profits, the copyright owner is required to present proof
only of the infringer's gross revenue, and the infringer is required to prove his or her
deductible expenses and the elements of profit attributable to factors other than the
copyrighted work. 
146
No mention is made of equity. Defendant's profits are routinely recoverable.
Three problems recur with awards of profits: (1) establishing the expenses
that are properly deductible from the infringer's gross revenue; (2)
apportioning the "elements of profit attributable to factors other than the
[infringed] copyrighted work"; and (3) once profits are established, avoiding
improper cumulation with plaintiff's actual damages.
Deriving net profits from gross receipts leads to several sub-problems with
allocating expenses. Fortunately, most of these are soluble via standard
practices in cost accounting, and need not detain us here. 47 It is, however,
appropriate to observe that the burden of establishing expenses falls entirely
on the defendant. When the defendant cannot or will not prove expenses,
extraordinary windfalls can occur. The extreme instance is Blackman v. Hustler
Magazine, Inc. ,148 in which the plaintiff offered to sell nude photographs of a
fleetingly notorious woman to the magazine for $35,000. The perennially
notorious Larry Flynt simply misappropriated the pictures, exploited them
widely, and then claimed that Hustler's books had been lost. In the end, this
frivolity cost Flynt almost $2 million.
Once total profits have been calculated, the trier must decide what else,
aside from the infringed work, contributed to those profits. The classic case,
(which also settled that an apportionment is appropriate) is Sheldon v. Metro-
Goldwyn Pictures Corp. 149 In Sheldon, the Supreme Court affirmed an award of
20 percent of the profits from a motion picture to the authors of a play from
146. 17 USC § 504(b).
147. See 3 Nimmer on Copyright § 14.03 at 14-23 through 14-38 (cited in note 3). One major
element of expense that continues to be contentious is the deductibility of income taxes paid on
accountable profits. Courts inject an appraisal of defendant's conduct; if the infringement was
"conscious and deliberate," credit for income taxes may be denied. Larson Co. v Wrigley Co., 277 US
97, 99 (1928). Compare Love v Kimny, 2 Copyright L Rptr (CCH) 26, 789 (SDNY 1991) (credit
denied also when infringement non-willful, on ground that, since infringer's profits paid to plaintiff
will be deductible by defendant, there will be no taxable income on that amount).
148. 800 F2d 1160 (DC Cir 1986).
149. 309 US 390 (1939).
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which too much of the film was derived. Courts often say that they err on the
side of generosity to the prevailing plaintiff. Only approximations are
possible in most cases.' 50 Under the statute, the infringer has the burden of
establishing what the apportionment should be.
Despite concerns that plaintiffs were receiving windfalls, cases construing
the 1909 Copyright Act' 5 1 became quite indulgent in allowing plaintiffs to
recover both their lost profits and the defendant's profits. This trend, most
marked in the Second Circuit,' 52 arose in part because of some rather loose
language in the 1909 statute, which directed the infringer to pay, beyond
actual damages, "all the profits which the infringer shall have made"t 53-rather
ignoring the next three words, "from such infringement."' 154 The 1976
statute attempted to curb immoderate cumulation by allowing "any profits...
that are attributable to the infringement and are not taken into account in
computing the actual damages."' 55 There are endless divergences that can
develop between the plaintiff's supposed damages and the defendant's
profits. The straightforward way to approach such a problem requires taking
whatever steps are necessary to establish actual damages, then determining
whether defendant's profits, properly apportioned, exceed plaintiff's
damages. Plaintiff is then entitled to the larger amount. Judge Posner
followed essentially this approach in a leading post-1976 decision on avoiding
improper cumulation.156
B. Patents
In striking contrast to the routine recognition of defendants' profits in
copyright law, the patent statute makes no provision for such awards.
For a long time prior to 1946, patentees could recover both damages and
profits. The predecessor to section 284 listed profits first: "in addition to the
profits to be accounted for by the defendant, the damages the complainant
has sustained .... 57 Suddenly, in 1946,158 all references to profits were
eliminated and the statute acquired substantially its present content. 59
Congress' intent has not become clearer with time. The brief committee
report that accompanied the 1946 change stressed the complexity of
accountings of profits. It also added a cryptic throwaway line: "[T]he bill
150. A beguiling recent example is Sygma Photo News, Inc v High Society Magazine, Inc., 778 F2d 89,
94-96 (2d Cir 1985), where the court had to decide how much an infringing nude photograph of
Raquel Welch contributed to the profits of a "skin" magazine cover. Faced with estimates of 20%
and 75%, the court settled on 50%.
151. Copyright Act of 1909, 35 Stat 1075, superseded by 17 USC §§ 101 et seq (1988).
152. See especially Thomas Wilson & Co. v Irving]. Dorfman Co., 433 F2d 409 (2d Cir 1970).
153. Copyright Act of 1909 § 25(b), 35 Stat at 1081 (emphasis added).
154. Id.
155. 17 USC § 504(b).
156. Taylor v Meirick, 712 F2d 1112, 1119-21 (7th Cir 1983); compare Abeshouse v Ultragraphics,
Inc., 754 F2d 467 (2d Cir 1985). Cumulation is not permissible in trademark cases. Century Distilling
Co. v Continental Distilling Corp., 205 F2d 140, 149 (3d Cir 1953).
157. Act of July 8th, 1870 § 55, 16 Stat 206.
158. Act of August 1, 1946, 60 Stat 778.
159. Though it was substantially recast in the Patent Act of 1952, 66 Stat 792.
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would not preclude the recovery of profits as an element of general
damages." 60
In 1964, the Supreme Court weighed in rather heavy-handedly, flatly
declaring that "[t]he purpose of the change was precisely to eliminate the
recovery of profits as such and allow recovery of damages only."' 16 1 This
assertion came in the second round of Aro Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible Top
Replacement Co. ,162 a battered landmark of contributory infringement that had
little to do with the availability of profits. Furthermore, Justice Brennan made
this pronouncement in a section of his opinion that had the support of only
four justices. Justice Harlan abstained as to that part. The four dissenters,
however, had nothing whatever to say about profits. They were not in favor of
awarding anything to the plaintiff.
The plurality's discussion in Aro, whatever its proper weight, caused the
lower courts to fall into line. 163 The Supreme Court again spoke in 1983,
citing Aro for a passing observation that "[i]n 1946 Congress excluded
consideration of the infringer's gain by eliminating the recovery of profits."'' 6 4
Only the irrepressible Judge Rich has gone against the current. In a 1985
decision for a panel of the Federal Circuit, he held that evidence of
defendants' profits continues to be relevant in calculating a reasonable
royalty, or as a reasonable approximation "of the patent owner's lost
profits."' 165 The case, to be sure, was one where plaintiff and defendant were
alone in the "marsh buggy" market and there were no complicating elements
such as unpatented components.
A final oddity of this aberration in remedies jurisprudence is that
defendants' profits are still recoverable for infringement of a design patent. 166
Is this simply an oversight, or does it reflect the proximity of design patent to
copyright?
C. Trademarks
One would expect an accounting of profits to be routinely available in
trademark cases. The Lanham Act, after all, is similar to the patent statute
before the 1946 amputation of profits in that profits are mentioned before
damages. 167 Yet the rhetoric, and apparently the practice, is quite different.
160. HR Rep No 1587, 79th Cong, 2d Sess 2 (1946), cited in Chisum, 5 Patents § 20.02 at 20-60.1
(cited in note 3).
161. 377 US 476, 505 (1964).
162. The original round was Aro Manufacturing Co. v Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 US 336
(1961).
163. See Chisum, 5 Patents § 20.02[4] at 20-58 through 20-70 (cited in note 3).
164. General Motors Corp. v Devex, 461 US 648, 654 (1983).
165. Kori Corp. v Wilco Marsh Buggies & Draglines, 761 F2d 649, 655 (Fed Cir 1985) (also explaining
the 1946 elimination of profits from the statute). See also Slimfold Mfg. Co. v Kinkead Industries, Inc.,
932 F2d 1453, 1458 (Fed Cir 1991) (Judge Rich writes that an assertedly low royalty award "was not
the only damages which the district court awarded; the district court also awarded all profits that
Kinkead realized in the form of manufacturing cost savings.").
166. 35 USC § 289 (1988) ([Tlhe infringer "shall be liable to the owner to the extent of his total
profit but not less than $250 .... ").
167. See 15 USC § ll17(a).
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An award of profits is generally said to require a finding that the infringement
was "deliberate," ".willful," or in "bad faith."' 68
McCarthy neatly characterizes these hurdles to an award of profits by
saying that "[t]he courts appear not willing to grant an accounting of profits
unless the judge 'gets mad' at the defendant."' 69 Judges do seem to "get
mad" rather frequently. Where the infringement was short-lived, however-
as in Reader's Digest Assoc. Inc. v. Conservative Digest, Inc. ,170 where defendant's
excessive imitation of the appearance of Reader's Digest's cover occurred for
only two issues-no profits are awarded. It does appear that the courts, in
searching for "bad" behavior before they will award profits, are influenced by
the statute's invocation of "principles of equity," a constraint no longer found
in the copyright statute.
Although the equitable elements seem to impel courts to search for "bad
faith" and other pejoratives, once these have been found, equity assists the
plaintiff. Damages are not available in trademark cases unless the plaintiff can
prove some injury, which she often cannot do. No time is proof of damage
more difficult than when the plaintiff desires to stop the use of her mark on
non-competing goods. Familiar trademark law may allow a plaintiff to enjoin
such use, depending on an array of factors.' 7' In an increasing number of
cases, she may also get an accounting of profits. These measures are justified
by the concept of unjust enrichment, invoked "subject to the principles of
equity."' 72 A leading case is emphatic that "[t]he dollar amount of the
recovery in an accounting for profits under the unjust enrichment rationale
has no relation to the damages, if any, sustained by the plaintiff in the
action." 73 Deterrence of further infringement is another rationale.
As in calculations of profits by copyright infringers, the defendant may
deduct certain expenses to establish net profits. The court must allow the
defendant to attempt to apportion any profits between those attributable to
the infringement and those allocable, for example, to the "goodness" of his
goods. 174 A recent vivid example of a generous allocation of profits in a case
where the trial court found no actual damages, nor any reason to levy a
reasonable royalty nor to require corrective advertising, is Sands, Taylor &
168. McCarthy, 2 Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 30:25 at 498 (cited in note 3). Compare
Roulo v Russ Berrie, 886 F2d 931, 941 (7th Cir 1989) (stating that "[tihere is no express requirement
... that the infringer wilfully infringe the trade dress to justify an award of profits"). But the court in
Roulo still emphasized "principles of equity" and "equitable considerations." Id. Roulo is of unusual
interest because the court found both copyright and trade dress infringement. Yet the discussion of
monetary remedies dwelt entirely on Lanham Act cases.
169. McCarthy, 2 Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 30:25 at 498 (cited in note 3).
170. 831 F2d 800 (DC Cir 1987). This was another instance like Roulo, 886 F2d 931, where,
although the same activity constituted both copyright and trade dress infringement, the remedy
discussion was entirely directed to the Lanham Act.
171. ALl Restatement § 21 at 187-88 (cited in note 39).
172. 15USC § 1117(a).
173. Maier Brewing Co. v Fleishmann Distilling Corp.. 390 F2d 117, 124 (9th Cir 1968); see also
Monsanto Chemical Co. v Perfect Fit Products Mfg. Co., 349 F2d 389, 391-92 (2d Cir 1965); contra, see
McCarthy, 2 Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 30:25 at 504 n16 (cited in note 3).
174. See Gilson, Trademark Protection and Practice § 8.08[3] at 8-16 (cited in note 3).
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Wood v. Quaker Oats Co. 75 Quaker Oats, the manufacturer of Gatorade, made
heavy deliberate use of plaintiff's registered mark, "Thirst Aid," in
advertising that "Gatorade is Thirst Aid." Plaintiff was using the mark
modestly at the institutional level "on ice cream toppings."' 76 The trial court
decided that 10 percent of Gatorade's pre-tax profits were attributable to the
infringing slogan, and awarded the plaintiff $24.7 million "to prevent
defendant's unjust enrichment."' 77
This brief sketch of recovery of profits in trademark cases may convey a
misleading impression that some degree of clarity exists in the cases. The
most penetrating examination of the topic speaks of the "hodgepodge and
confusion of judge-made rules of recovery," and especially condemns
accounting for profits as a "common law dinosaur surviving more by tradition
than utility." 178
VI
ENHANCED RECOVERY
A. Copyright
The copyright scheme of statutory damages179-which specifies a range of
civil penalties payable to a prevailing plaintiff, not to the government-is
probably unique. ' 8 0
The present schedule is a simplified version of that in the 1909 Act, the
origins of which can be traced, in part, back to 1831.181 The 1909 Act, in an
elaborate schedule, included such oddities as $50 for every infringing delivery
of a lecture, sermon, or address. But these amounts were not mandatory; they
were inserted merely as "an aid to the court in awarding such damages 'as
shall appear to be just ' 8 2" within a minimum of $250 and a maximum of
$5000. The floor and ceiling were only recently raised to $500 and $20,000,
in recognition of inflation, and as an incentive to register works in the
Copyright Office. 183
175. 18 USPQ2d 1457 (ND Ill 1991).
176. Id at 1463.
177. Id at 1474. With interest and fees, the judgment (the largest ever, and now on appeal) came
to $42.6 million.
178. James M. Koelemay, Jr., Monetary Relief for Trademark Infringement under the Lanham Act, 72
Trademark Rptr 458, 525, 537 (1982).
179. 17 USC § 504(c).
180. For example, there are liquidated damages provisions in the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29
USC § 216(b) (1988), carried over into the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 USC § 636(b)
(1988), which offer liquidated damages in addition and equal in amount to actual damages for lost
back pay in cases of willful violations. See Thurston v Trans World Airlines, Inc., 469 US I 11, 125-28
(1985). But they do not have the flexibility in application and amount that the copyright provisions
do.
181. See generally, William S. Strauss, The Damage Provisions of the Copyright Law, in The Copyright
Society of the USA, Studies on Copyright 995, 1003-07 (Rothman/Bobbs-Merrill, 1963).
182. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co. v Buck, 283 US 202, 207 (1931).
183. Statutory damages are unavailable unless timely registration is accomplished. 17 USC
§ 412(2). The recent increases came in the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub L
No 100-568, 102 Stat 2853 § 10(b).
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In the past, much attention was paid to minimum damages because of their
usefulness as a weapon for movie distributors pursuing unlicensed exhibitors
and to music publishers trying to police public performances without licenses
from ASCAP or BMI.184 Movie exhibitors, now fewer in number, seem to
have become more law-abiding. A steady trickle of reported cases continues,
however, against taverns, retail stores, and juke-box operators without
licenses to perform copyrighted music. In addition, recalcitrant non-licensees
continue to try to defend themselves-almost always without success.1 85
The most striking change in the 1976 general revision was to shift the
power to choose statutory damages from the court to the copyright owner.
The next major innovation offered an opportunity for the copyright owner
who so elected to prove that the infringement "was committed willfully."
Then the court in its discretion may award up to $100,000 (doubled from
$50,000 in 1988). 186
Damages for willful infringement are a powerful tool for a plaintiff who
might have difficulty proving either actual damages or defendant's profits.
Two problems recur in definition and administration. First, what is
"willfulness"? The prevailing test, inspired by the Nimmer treatise, 87
assumes willfulness from a finding that the defendant knows that the work she
is copying is protected. 8 8 In a typical violation of musical performance
rights, the infringer will have been warned that she should have a license;
thus, willfulness is indisputable. When the facts are less clear-cut, the
obligation to establish a defendant's subjective knowledge may tempt the trier
and the plaintiff to apply a less exacting standard, such as presumed
knowledge, or a "should have known" test.' 8 9 This temptation should be
184. See generally Ralph S. Brown, The Operation of the Damage Provisions of the Copyright Law: An
Exploratory Study ("Exploratory Study"), in Copyright Society of USA, ed, 2 Studies on Copyright at 1067,
1078-82 (cited in note 10).
185. A rare recent exception is found in a decision that interpreted, in favor of a large chain of
small retail stores, the provision in 17 USC § 110(5) that allows the use of "home-style" receivers in
business establishments. Edison Brothers Stores v Broadcast Music Inc., 954 F 2d 1419 (8th Cir 1992); see
also Broadcast Music, Inc., v Claire's Boutiques, Inc., 949 F2d 1482 (7th Cir 1991).
The stores in both cases persuaded the triers and the courts of appeals that the number of stores
was not as significant as their small size in bringing them within the statutory exemption, which was
tailored to the facts in Twentieth Century Music Corp. v Aiken, 422 US 151 (1975) (receipt of copyrighted
songs on radio of small business establishment held not an unlicensed performance).
186. Berne Implementation Act of 1988 § 10(b), 102 Stat at 2860. In the 1909 Act the
forerunner of "committed willfully," was "after actual notice," and there was no ceiling. 35 Stat
1075. But until recently there were few reported instances of awards in excess of $5,000. See
Brown, Exploratory Study at 1085 (cited in note 184). However, things have changed since 1958. See,
for example, Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v McDonald's Corp., 221 USPQ 114 (CD Cal
1983) ($1,044,000); Kamar Intl v Russ Berrie & Co., Inc., 829 F2d 783 (9th Cir 1987) (award of
$460,000 which represented 400% of defendant's gross profits). Both cases were governed by the
1909 statute.
187. 3 Nimmer on Copyright § 14.04[B][3] at 14-48 through 14-49 (cited in note 3).
188. See, for example, RCA/Ariola Intl, Inc. v Thomas & Graystone Co., 845 F2d 773 (8th Cir 1988)
(tape-to-tape record copying; willfulness not found despite incriminating circumstances).
189. See, for example, Video Views, Inc. v Studio 21, Ltd., 925 F2d 1010 (7th Cir 1991) (includes,
among other things, an interesting discussion of willfulness, but in a situation where the trial judge
set aside a jury verdict of willfulness as unsupported by evidence. Accordingly, the following
statement, in support of a "reckless disregard" or "should have known" standard, vivid though it is,
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resisted. The infringer will not escape liability if willfulness is not found; she
remains liable for regular statutory damages of $500 to $20,000 or for actual
damages and profits.' 90
The second problem is the calculation of statutory damages, which is
required whether or not willfulness is found. The statute provides no
guidance; the court can guess what actual damages or profits might have
been. If an award is increased for willfulness, it is considered appropriate to
consider deterrence, especially since the possibility of enhanced statutory
damages is said to preclude the award of additional punitive damages.' 9 ' For
example, performing rights collection agencies ordinarily may be content to
recover the equivalent of lost license fees. In a recent case, 192 where a club
owner was extraordinarily recalcitrant, however (he would not take a license
from ASCAP, though he had one from BMI), the court awarded $40,000 plus
attorney's fees of about the same magnitude, which the court said was three
times the evaded license fees' 9g-an obvious echo of the triple damages that
are sometimes available in patent and trademark cases.
Copyright liability is strict liability. The only provisions that assist
innocent infringers194 are found in the statutory damages section. They
provide for a reduction of minimum damages from $500 to $200 per
infringement if the infringer "was not aware and had no reason to believe that
his or her acts constituted an infringement."'195 Further, academic and public
broadcasting institutions can escape statutory damages altogether if they or
their employees believed that their infringements were fair use. This
exemption mollified educators who wanted a broad fair use exemption for
their copying. There is little reported application of these diminished
damages.
Finally, many issues concerning multiple infringements were not resolved
or were imperfectly resolved by the 1909 Act. For example, if 200 network
stations broadcast a song without permission, it was unclear whether that
constituted one or 200 infringements.' 96 The present act, with apparent
probably counts as dictum: "[Olne who undertakes a course of infringing conduct may neither sneer
in the face of the copyright owner nor hide its head in the sand like an ostrich." Id at 1021.
Video Views is also the latest statement on the controverted issue of a right to jury trial when the
plaintiff seeks only statutory damages. The court held that, even though the trial judge decides the
amount of statutory damages, there is a constitutional right to a jury trial on the questions of
infringement and willfulness. Id at 1016. See generally Brown & Denicola, eds, Cases on Copyright at
432 (cited in note 60).
190. One commentator would go a little beyond requiring "actual knowledge." See Note, Willful
Copyright Infringement: In Search of a Standard, 65 Wash L Rev 903, 914-19 (1990) (authored by Jeffrey
M. Thomas) (A demonstration of likely knowledge of adverse rights would impose on the defendant
a burden of showing that she made further investigation of the plaintiff's rights and reasonably
concluded that she was not infringing.). This proposal derives from patent law.
191. 3 Nimmer on Copyright § 14.02[B] at 14-19 (cited in note 3).
192. Chi-Boy Music v Charlie Club, Inc., 930 F2d 1224 (7th Cir 1991).
193. Id at 1229-30.
194. Aside from people misled by omission of notice during the period January 1, 1978 to March
I, 1989, after which notice became optional. See 17 USC § 405(b).
195. Id § 504(c)(2).
196. 200, according to Law v National Broadcasting Co., 51 F Supp 798, 799 (SDNY 1943).
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clarity, states that the $500 minimum and $20,000 maximum apply "to all
infringements involved in the action with respect to any one work." 97 Thus,
if the network performed the song on 200 stations and on 200 occasions, it
would appear to be liable for only one infringement. This austerity has
created its own difficulties and complaints, which the treatises and
commentators cover quite adequately.'19
B. Patents
Both the patent and the trademark statutes use the same vehicle for
enhanced recoveries: judicial discretion to increase damages up to three
times the amount of actual damages found. 199 There is, however, enough
variation of approach in the two fields to warrant separate discussion.
Furthermore, while recovery of defendants' profits is excluded from the
patent statute, the Lanham Act's damages section has an odd provision that
authorizes the court either to increase or decrease profits "as the court shall
find to be just."20 0
The level of conduct that is said to justify enhancing patent damages is the
same "willfulness" mentioned above in copyright. 20 1 "Bad faith" is equally
emphasized. Two policy considerations must be balanced: on the one hand,
infringement should be deterred; on the other, there is a public interest in
allowing competitors to test the validity of patents. 202 Accordingly, courts
routinely recite that "[a]n increase in damages for willfulness . . . is generally
inappropriate when the infringer mounts a good faith and substantial
challenge to the existence of infringement. ' '203 The profusion of litigation is
perhaps sufficient testimony to the uncertainties that attend inquiries into the
good faith of challenges both to validity and to infringement. 20 4 Accordingly,
the putative infringer must proceed with some caution; the orthodox way of
avoiding "bad faith" is to seek an opinion from a competent patent attorney
that a patent you wish to ignore is not valid, or, if it is, that what you propose
to do does not infringe. 20 5
197. 17 USC § 504(c)(1).
198. See Goldstein, 2 Copyright § 12.2.2 at 342-51 (cited in note 3); 3 Nimmer on Copyright
§ 14.04[D] at 14.55 (cited in note 3). Consider also Walt Disney Co. v Powell, 897 F2d 565, 569-70 (DC
Cir 1990) (six different poses of Mickey and Minnie Mouse on T-shirts constituted only two
infringements, not twelve as the trial court found). An able student note is critical of this opinion.
See Statutory Damages for the Multiple Infringement of a Copyrighted Work, 6 Cardozo Arts & Enter L J 463
(1988) (authored by Peter Thea).
199. 35 USC § 284 (patents); 15 USC § 1117(b) (trademarks).
200. 15 USC § l117(a).
201. But note that the statute itself gives no guidance whatever to the court.
202. Lear, Inc. v Atkins, 395 US 653, 670-71 (1969).
203. Paper Converting Machine Co. v Magna-Graphics, 745 F2d 11, 20 (Fed Cir 1984).
204. See Chisum, 5 Patents § 20.03[4][b] at 20-179.3 (cited in note 3).
205. Id § 20.03[b][iv], [v] at 20-180ff. To the skeptical outsider (including the author), the
attention that courts in patent cases give to the opinions of counsel is almost touching. They are
appraised within "the totality of circumstances," which is a ubiquitous phrase. See, for example,
cases cited in id § 20.03[4] at 20-185. Reliance on the opinions of counsel rarely surface in other
intellectual property cases. In patent law, there appears to be a benign full employment program for
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Also relevant to increased damages are the circumstances that will permit a
finding that the defendant was excusably ignorant of the existence of the
threatening patent. Relevant to this excuse-which may be effective-is the
patent statute's position on marking patented articles. Unless the familiar
"Patent" or "Pat." followed by the patent number is properly attached, no
damages, ordinary or enhanced, can be had except for in cases of
infringements occurring after the patentee has begun affixing proper notices
or the infringer had actual notice of the claimed infringement.
20 6
Once the patentee has vaulted all these hurdles, the amount of increased
damages seems to repose largely in the discretion of the trialjudge. Reported
outcomes range from one-quarter through double damages to the maximum
of triple damages 207 -accompanied, "in exceptional cases," by "reasonable
attorney fees." 20 8
C. Trademarks
Exercise of the discretion to increase trademark damages may be inhibited
by the relatively high threshold for monetary awards generally found in
trademark law. But if a plaintiff has established the existence of damages, and
can further persuade the trier that the infringement was willful and in bad
faith, the trial court may award up to triple damages. Similarly, the court has
discretion to increase or, uniquely, to decrease an award of defendant's profits.
This clause is also unique in that there is no stated ceiling on a particular
increase of profits. However, the profits adjustment clause has rarely been
used, and its limits have not been tested. If it is already true, as McCarthy
suggests, that profits in trademark cases are awarded only if the judge is "mad
at" the defendant, 20 9 it would seem to require truly outrageous conduct to
justify magnifying profits. Reducing profits can be a roundabout way of
accounting for profits not resulting from the infringement 210 or, more
appropriately, for an equitable judgment that all of a defendant's large profits
would unjustly enrich the plaintiff.2 1'
Overhanging both damages and profits enhancement is the penultimate
admonition of section 35 that "[s]uch sum in either of the above
circumstances shall constitute compensation and not a penalty." 21 2 Read as
an admonition, the clause is troublesome. How can tripling actual damages
patent lawyers, aimed only at avoiding enhanced damages. The numerous decisions staking out the
limits of reliance on such opinions deserve anthropological exploration, but not in this article.
206. 35 USC § 287; see also Chisum, 5 Patents § 20.03[7][c] at 20-249 through 20-266.8 (cited in
note 3).
207. Chisum, 5 Patents § 20.03[4][b][[vi] at 20-198.15 through 20-198.19 (cited in note 3).
208. 35 USC § 285.
209. See text accompanying note 169.
210. See Pure Oil Co. v Paragon Oil Co., 117 USPQ 321, 328-29 (ND Ohio 1950).
211. Stuart v Collins, 489 F Supp 827, 833-34 (SDNY 1980). This is a thoughtful opinion by Judge
Leval that also denied an injunction on the ground that defendant's complete appropriation of a
little-used mark rendered it no longer useful to the plaintiff. Id at 835.
212. It is possible that "the above circumstances" phrase refers only to the two-way adjustment of
profits. But James Koelemay thinks that it includes both damages and profits. See Koelemay, 72
Trademark Rptr at 519 n356 (cited in note 178).
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not penalize the defendant? Indeed, courts refer to enhancement as a
deterrent.213
The seeming contradiction of authorizing triple damages and then
emphasizing that they must be compensatory can be explained. The key to
the explanation is the word "penal." To say that an award is "penal" is to
discredit it. Thus, courts will not enforce the penal judgments of another
sovereign. 21 4 Penal impositions are strictly construed. 215 Consequently, the
1909 Copyright Act asserted that its statutory damages provision, with a $250
minimum, "shall not be regarded as a penalty." 21 6 The Supreme Court
interpreted the "in lieu" damages of the 1909 Act as authorizing recoveries
where damages were impractical to prove, without their incurring the stigma
of being "penal." 217
Koelemay explained that the drafters of the Lanham Act in 1946 borrowed
the idea from the Copyright Act, and embellished it with the "shall constitute
compensation" phrase. 218 So, it seems quite probable that the "not a
penalty" clause is not an admonition at all. Rather, it is simply an invitation to
increase damages in appropriate cases. Courts that ignore the clause 2 19 are
not disrespectful of it.
Conscientious courts do take seriously the seeming constraint that flows
from a simple reading of the clause, however. Two recent court of appeals
decisions are on point. Jurgens v. McKasy 2 20 was tried in the Federal Circuit
because the plaintiff had a patent on the wind-inflated goose that was a
popular yard ornament for a while. The plaintiff prevailed both on its patent
and on trade-dress infringement claims under Lanham Act section 43(a).2 2 1
The court doubled the patent damages and tripled the Lanham Act
damages. 22 2 The court of appeals had no difficulty with the doubled patent
damages, but balked at increasing the Lanham Act damages (as found by the
jury), because the trial court had said that the trebling was punitive.
Apparently, the Federal Circuit equated "punitive" with "penal," or rather
thought that the regional circuit would do so. 2 23
In another trade dress case, 224 which involved the appearance of
restaurants, the trial court doubled a jury award of $934,000. The Fifth
213. See, for example, Polo Fashions v Rabanne, 661 F Supp 89, 96 (SD Fla 1986).
214. A classic statement of this principle can be found in Huntington v Attrill, 146 US 657, 666-78
(1892).
215. See Koelemay, 72 Trademark Rptr at 522 n377 (cited in note 178).
216. Copyright Act of 1909 § 25(b), 35 Stat at 1075.
217. Douglas v Cunningham, 294 US 207, 209-10 (1935).
218. Koelemay, 72 Trademark Rptr at 522-23 (cited in note 178).
219. See id at 517 n346.
220. 927 F2d 1552 (Fed Cir 1991).
221. 15 USC § 1125(a).
222. The opinion does not provide any amounts except for an $800,000 punitive damage award
made pursuant to state law, awarded by the jury and set aside by the judge.
223. The Federal Circuit must defer to the law of the regional circuit in trademark cases. Id at
1564.
224. Taco Cabana Intl Inc. v Two Pesos, Inc., 932 F2d 1113 (5th Cir 1991), cert granted Jan 27, 1992.
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Circuit was troubled by the apparent anomaly of the "not a penalty" clause,
but rose above its unease as it had once previously. 22 5
If the interpretation of the "not a penalty" clause suggested above22 6 is
correct, there is nothing to worry about. The Federal Circuit has been too
cautious. All the clause does is declare that enhanced damages and profits
authorized by Congress are "not a penalty." 227 It does not require courts to
refrain from awarding them.
It has recently been settled that punitive damages, as such, cannot be given
in Lanham Act cases.2 28 Some commentators have suggested that a litigant
use the common law "unfair competition" route that recognizes essentially
the same rights as does the trademark statute, and that by travelling that road
she can obtain punitive damages. 229 Examination of the few appellate cases
cited for this proposition does not wholly support it except in one instance.2 30
In a 1980 decision in the Eighth Circuit, 23' the plaintiff contended that
section 35, the remedies provision of the Lanham Act, was not exclusive in a
suit based on section 43(a) of the Act, and that plaintiff was entitled to "all
remedies available in the common law, including punitive damages." The
court replied, "We cannot agree ... [because] section 35 should be applied in
the manner in which it is applied to all Lanham Act suits; it should be viewed
as setting forth the exclusive remedy. Accordingly, the district court has
broad discretion to fashion a just remedy consistent with section 35, including
treble damages." 23 2
225. Boston Professional Hockey v Dallas Cap, 597 F2d 71, 77 (5th Cir 1979). The Taco Cabana court
suggested that there might be undercompensated damages in a case like Boston Professional Hockey,
which it characterized as one of "brazen infringement and rapid market foreclosure." 932 F2d at
1128.
226. And which is implicit, I think, in Koelemay's analysis. See Koelemay, 72 Trademark Rptr
458 (cited in note 178).
227. See 15 USC § 1117(b) (requiring triple profits or damages for using counterfeit marks "unless
the court finds extenuating circumstances"). One dares not ponder what a "counterfeit" is. See
General Electric Co. v Speicher, 877 F2d 531, 534-35 (7th Cir 1989) (inclusion of non-trademarked
inserts in boxes stamped with registered trademark held to "counterfeit" trademark within meaning
of Lanham Act). On the sharp bite of § 1117(b), see Judge Posner's decision on Louis Vuitton S.A. v
Lee, 875 F2d 587, 588 (7th Cir 1989).
228. Getty Petroleum Corp. v Bartco Petroleum Corp., 858 F2d 103, 113 (2d Cir 1988).
229. McCarthy 2 Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 30:29 at 517-18 (cited in note 3).
230. Transgo, Inc. v Ajac Transmission Parts Corp., 768 F2d 1001 (9th Cir 1985), which combined
copyright, trademark, and unfair competition claims. The jury was stingy with actual damages but
awarded $100,000 punitive damages, which was upheld. Id at 1024. The court never mentioned the
applicability of the Lanham Act. See also Universal City Studios v Nintendo Co. Ltd., 797 F2d 70 (2d Cir
1986), which also combined copyright, trademark (with Lanham Act references), and unfair
competition. The punitive damages award, upheld under New York standards, was described as
justified by a "tortious interference counterclaim." Id at 77-78. Accord, Bauer Lamp Co., Inc. v
Schaffer, 941 F2d 1165 (11 th Cir 1991) (§ 43(a) design case). Big 0 Tire Dealers, Inc. v Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 561 F2d 1365, 1373 (10th Cir 1977), described the punitive damages as being for
"trademark disparagement." The court declined to award defendant's profits, even though the
infringement was "wanton and reckless," because that would overcompensate the plaintiff. Id at
1374-76. A very similar reverse confusion case, Zasu Designs v L'Oreal S.A., 9 USPQ 2d 1972, 1979
(ND Il1 1988), included a punitive damage award of $1 million "under the law of Illinois."
231. Metric & Multistandard Components v Metrics, Inc., 635 F2d 710 (8th Cir 1980).
232. Id at 716.
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VII
CONCLUSION
Nothing remotely cosmic emerges from this survey, nor anything
surprising. Perhaps the nearest thing to a surprise is the agreeable
impression that the courts pay close attention to and faithfully follow the
governing statutes, exhibiting none of the veiled hostility to statutes in which
judges are sometimes said to indulge. This should not surprise anyone,
either. Patents and copyrights have been creatures of statute from the
beginning of the republic. 2 s3 The first comprehensive trademark statute, the
Lanham Act of 1946, has yet to reach the half-century mark; and it is not
exclusive of common law rights. Yet the Lanham Act is not only the home of
registered marks. The metamorphosis of section 43(a) as a resort for
unregistered marks2 3 4 has made the federal forum, and federal law, the
dominant backdrop for trademark litigation.
A historic strain that has demonstrated remarkable staying power is the
influence of equity, explicitly endorsed in some of the statutes. The courts
seem to take this tradition seriously. It justifies an attitude of flexibility. It
also seems to stimulate a somewhat moralistic preoccupation with bad faith
and willful behavior by infringers. I have no difficulty with most
manifestations of judicial distaste or indignation. In every field that we have
traversed, the range of infringing behavior is so extensive, from innocent to
outrageous, that it would be regrettable ifjudges (and juries) were held to the
precise limits of a defaulted contract for winter wheat.
Despite the many variations noted, the main themes of the three statutes
are essentially the same. The only major anomaly is the mysterious 1946
denial of defendants' profits in patent cases. Accountings to establish those
profits may be complicated, but they are possible. Reconstruction of a
plaintiff's losses is often an exercise in speculation; it deals with transactions
that never happened. I am mindful that the most thorough study of profit
awards and other elements of trademark recoveries calls profits awards a
"dinosaur"; 235 but dinosaurs are rather in vogue nowadays. It is possible that
the denial of defendants' profits in patent law is partly responsible for the too
elaborate criteria that must be satisfied in calculating damages and
hypothetical reasonable royalties.
Injunctions, the starting point of this article, especially display the lasting
imprint of equity. The significant development in this area is the trend toward
similar availability of injunctive relief in all three fields, in marked contrast to
the disparate treatment that Alan Latman found in 1970. This has required
facilitating the injunctive process in patent cases, and inhibiting it in
233. Copyright, to be sure, had a common law side for unpublished works until they were
brought into the statute in the 1976 General Revisions. See Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Unification: A
Cheerful Requiem for Common Law Copyright, 24 UCLA L Rev 1070 (1977).
234. See Joseph P. Bauer, A Federal Law of Unfair Competition: What Should be the Reach of Section
43(a) of the Lanham Act?, 31 UCLA L Rev 671 (1984).
235. Koelemay, 72 Trademark Rptr at 537 (cited in note 178).
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copyright. In copyright, the main impetus toward a degree of caution in
hurling injunctions is a welcome if belated one: an understanding that the
first amendment has a lot to say to copyright. 23 6 All copyright, after all, is
speech. 23 7
236. Recently, there has been a trickle of first amendment concern in connection with the parodic
or satiric use of others' trademarks. See Robert C. Denicola, Trademarks as Speech: Constitutional
Implications ofthe Emerging Rationales for the Protection of Trade Symbols, 1982 Wis L Rev 158; Harriette K.
Dorsen, Satiric Appropriation and the Law of Libel, Trademark and Copyright: Remedies without Wrongs, 65
Bost U L Rev 923 (1985).
237. A final personal note: It has been a bizarre experience, in looking up scores of cases, mostly
to be interested only in the last page or two of an opinion. That illustrates the observation at the
beginning of this article that remedies come at the end.
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